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a b s t r a c t
This paper explores contemporary policies and practices surround-
ing prenatal diagnosis, and seeks to challenge positive or simplistic
readings of these modern biomedical technologies by asking ques-
tions such as: what about feelings? How far is choice real? Can
disability be eliminated? How will diagnosis change in the future?
Discussion of lived experience of diagnosis is required to put ethical
or political debates in context.








r é s u m é
L’article explore les politiques et les pratiques contemporaines qui
entourent le diagnostic prénatal et questionne les lectures positives
et simplistes généralement associées à ces biotechnologies, à par-
tir de plusieurs questions centrales : qu’en est-il des sentiments ?
Peut-on parler de choix véritable ? Peut-on éliminer les handicaps ?
Quelles évolutions pour le diagnostic prénatal ? L’auteur conclut à
la nécessité de prendre en compte l’expérience vécue des femmes
et des couples pour resituer le débat éthique et politique dans son
contexte.
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This paper explores contemporary policies and practices surrounding prenatal diagnosis, and seeks
to challenge overly positive or simplistic readings of these modern biomedical technologies. The dis-
cussion sits at the interface of clinical genetics, disability studies, bioethics, and science studies,maybe
even theology. Unlike some commentators, I do not approach these issues with a ﬁrm sense that they
are morally wrong or socially undesirable, or that they risk returning us to a eugenic past, or even that
they are potentially damaging to the human rights of people with disabilities (Shakespeare, 2006).
I seek to explore the lived experience of prenatal diagnosis to indicate how screening and testing
can be a mixed blessing and to complicate issues which some discussions have represented as simply
beneﬁcent. First, I need to give a context, by which I mean I need to highlight my own methodology: in
this article, I explore two perspectives or discourses which predominate in the Anglophone literature
on prenatal diagnosis which I ﬁnd deﬁcient, and against which I wish to argue. Then I will advance
eight reasons, outlined in brief, for my overall ethical concern about the impact of genetic and other
prenatal diagnostic technologies on individuals and families in the early twenty-ﬁrst century.
“Knowledge is power”
Accounts in the media, and in popular science, whether presented by scientists themselves or
by other commentators, often represent genetic testing, especially prenatal diagnosis, in terms of
empowerment. Whereas in previous generations, people had no choice about reproduction, the claim
is that now science has created technologies which provide prospective parents with information,
which empowers them to make choices, thereby to promote the health of their families. Often, the
emphasis in these accounts is on the hard science– the tests, the markers, the probabilities – rather
than the human sciences –patient information, counselling, support –which are just as important if
patients are to make informed choices, minimise harm and anxiety, and emerge from the process
feeling resolved and empowered, not bruised and bewildered.
But despite this positive rhetoric and the expenditure of billions of dollars, genetics has so far
managed to do little directly to improve human health. Concrete outcomes–whether therapies or
pharmaceuticals or other interventions– are slow in arriving. Knowledge, so conﬁdently proclaimed
at the point of the sequencing of the human genome, turns out to be less complete and more uncertain
than previously imagined. The simple rules of Mendelian genetics are relevant to only rare single gene
diseases, while complex conditions, which often only occur late in life, turn out to be multifactorial.
The details of gene expression and regulation, and the interaction of genes with genes or genes with
environment appear to be ever more complex.
So far, few conditions can be diagnosed prenatally. Themajor application of testing is testing of bio-
chemical markers and chromosomes for Down syndrome rather than any genetic analysis. Diagnostic
ultrasound is probably more relevant to fears of eugenics than any DNA based technology.
While it is theoretically possible to isolate fetal cells in maternal blood and conduct DNA analysis,
this is not yet in clinical use. Pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) is an extremely rare process
which, at least in UK, is regulated closely. Franklin & Roberts (2006), for example, stress that PGD
is only offered to couples who have had a prior child-die of a diagnosable genetic disease. Prenatal
diagnosis via DNA is only offeredwhen a family is at known genetic risk because parents are carriers of
a recessive or X-linked condition. Cost and practicality currently prohibit the widespread deployment
application of genetic testing in pregnancy.
As I have written elsewhere (Shakespeare, 1999), the limitations of genetic knowledge do not only
undermine the more optimistic scenarios about health beneﬁts arising from genomics. The emerging
complexity and the lack of medical applications, also render the more apocalyptic scenarios of critics
of genetics less pressing. Genetic diagnosis will do less harm, but also less good, than was at one time
anticipated.
“Choice is freedom”
At the risk of ﬂagrant over-simpliﬁcation, the loudest currents in Anglo-American bioethics adopt
rather shallow reasoning around prenatal diagnosis. Many ethical judgements rely on the famous
“four principles” of Beauchamp and Childress, drawing on the traditions of Kantian deontology and
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anglo-saxon utilitarianism. While beneﬁcence, non-maleﬁcence, autonomy, and justice are meant to
play an equal role in this normative toolbox, in practice the value of autonomy predominates. Notions
of privacy and reproductive freedom invalidate social criticism of the theory or practice of prenatal
diagnosis, highlighting individual choice to the exclusion of the widespread social conditions that
shape it.
For secular thinkers, concerns about the sanctity of life or moral value of the embryo have scant
purchase. It is conventional to appeal to the human desire for healthy and happy children. Consistency
is cited against those who would support attempts to avoid existing people becoming impaired, but
object to attempt to prevent the existence of impaired future people. Logic is cited as a compelling
counter-argument against those who would both support abortion rights, but lament selective termi-
nation. If one does not object to terminations for social reasons,why object to terminations on grounds
of fetal abnormality?
Against those who would claim that disability is simply a different way of life, or that the main
problems for disabled people are generated by environmental barriers or structural inequality, liber-
tarian bioethicists such as Professor John Harris argue that disability is “a harmed condition one has a
logical preference not to be in” (Harris, 2001). Those disabled people who would insist otherwise are
mistaken: their subjective feelings have got in the way of the objective fact that it is better not to have
Down syndrome, spina biﬁda or visual impairment because these conditions either cause suffering,
or limit opportunities.
Feelings matter
My ﬁrst argument in favour of a more nuanced approach to evaluating the effects of prenatal
diagnosis is that neither scientiﬁc triumphalism nor bioethical perfectionism attends to the emotions
and feelings of key participants in the debate.
The impact of testing and termination onwomen is complex (Statham& Solomou, 2001). For some,
testing offers reassurance, control and relief. To many, it makes the experience of pregnancy a more
anxious time,whatever their decisionsor choices arounddiagnosis. For aminority, it creates a situation
where theyhave to choosewhether to terminate awantedpregnancy.Andhere thedifferencebetween
general support for abortion rights and speciﬁc concern around selective termination becomes rele-
vant: most social terminations, when a woman does not want to have a baby, occur in the ﬁrst few
months of pregnancy. In contrast, termination on grounds of fetal abnormality comes between 16
and 24 weeks in a wanted pregnancy: the woman wants to be a mother, but feels unable to become
mother of this child. The emotional consequences of these two decisions will often be very different,
as will the longer term feelings of guilt and pain for many women. For this reason, technologies which
bring the diagnosis and decision-making earlier in pregnancy– such as serum screening with ultra-
sound, or chorionic villus sampling (CVS) –becomeemotionally andmorally important (Williamset al.,
2005). Whether early or late in pregnancy, there is a lack of research on the psychological sequelae of
termination of wanted pregnancies (White-van Mourik, 1994).
The other stakeholders in the diagnosis debate are disabled people. There are many examples of
criticism by disabled people and organisations of trends towards prenatal diagnosis. Sometimes, these
challenges have been inﬂammatory and rhetorical. Not all of the arguments have been consistent or
sound. But rather than rejecting disability critiques as hysterical or ill-informed, it is preferable to
understand the feelings of hurt and rejection which underlie these challenges.
As a result of the popularity of genetics, disabled people risk once more being deﬁned as medical
abnormalities and invalids, rather than as citizens, or victims of injustice. They see measures being
implemented to prevent the birth of others with their conditions. They might think of whether their
own parentswould have taken advantage of such technologies. Theymight consider differential treat-
ment of fetuses with and without disability to be discriminatory: in UK, termination is illegal after the
24th week of pregnancy, except in case of severe abnormality. No matter if these late terminations
are very rare: the message has been sent that it is better to be dead than disabled.
What I am describing here has been labelled the “expressivist objection”, the idea that prena-
tal diagnosis “expresses” a negative valuation of the lives of people with disabilities (Parens & Asch,
2000). This argument is rather weak philosophically. But here, I want to draw attention not to the
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validity of the claim, but more to the actual feelings and reactions of disabled people. “Expressivism”
is not necessarily rational or logical, but it is important. Whether one views these feelings as jus-
tiﬁed or mistaken, they exist and are another example of the damage done to human lives by the
increased availability of prenatal diagnosis, and the wider discourse surrounding it. Disabled people
are not necessarily criticising particular decisions, but often are expressing deep concern about the
general “direction of travel” of reproduction and pregnancy, with screening out disability increasingly
considered as an issue of quality control.
There is also someevidence that attitudes to disability change, as a result of the advent of screening:
Down syndrome, for example, becomes not a random accident or act of God, but something which
could have been prevented (Marteau & Drake, 1995). Families with Down syndrome children may be
felt blameworthy. In some health and welfare regimes, this might be treated as “elective disability”,
not entitled to coverage from private or social insurance. Strangers in the street might look askance
at the choices of someone who could have avoided this undesirable outcome, even when in fact this
was impossible (for example, when screening fails).
“This technology makes every woman into a bioethicist”
I have never forgotten this comment referring to amniocentesis by Rayna Rapp (1999) in her book,
Testing the Woman, Testing the Fetus, an empirical account of decisions about prenatal diagnosis. She
sums up how many, but not all, women and men deal with difﬁcult decisions around testing and
termination in pregnancy. Of course, there are those who will be businesslike and unemotional about
screening and diagnosis, welcoming the opportunity to be informed and take control. But I suspect
that there are many others who worry about what to do, and agonise about whether it is morally or
religiously justiﬁed to test or to terminate. They will ask themselves questions about whether it is
right to use this power, about what makes life worth living, about what to do in the best interests of
the potential baby, their other children, their marriage or their own life. They will worry about the act
itself, and about the consequences of the act: would they regret it, either way?
This suggests and highlights how choice itself can be problematic. In the past, people did not have
this level of power and control over their pregnancies, which was both bad and good. Now, people
can take responsibility for something which previously was left to chance, God or karma. Potentially,
the 700,000 UK pregnancies each year expose 1.4 million potential parents to screening anxiety and
the burden of choice. In my discussions with couples, and in research, parents of disabled children
often reﬂect that they are glad they did not have to make such a choice. In previous generations, once
safe and reliable contraception was available, prospective parents could only control the number and
timing of their children. Now they can increasingly inﬂuence the nature of their children, a move from
quantity to quality control. Sometimes, ignorance is bliss.
Human, all too human
Bioethical and biomedical versions of prenatal diagnosis also fail to account for the complexity and
vulnerability of human embodiment. The drive for the “perfect baby” will never eliminate disability,
because frailty and impairment are a fact of life. While a small number of conditions can be detected,
and potentially screened out, this leaves many other sources of variation and vulnerability. Genetics
reveals that everygenomecarrieswithin it at least onehundredmutations. Thosewhoappear “normal”
may be predestined to disease, or have a higher risk of cancer, dementia or heart disease.
Discourses on disability and diagnosis sometimes imply a polar dichotomy between the normal
baby, for whom upbringing is plain sailing, soon to become independent, from the start a source of
pride, and the baby with disability, destined to be a disappointment and a burden. Yet all children
are, in some ways, a burden and also a joy. Even choosing the “best fetus” cannot guarantee that your
child will be free from impairment or illness. Approximately 1–2% of births are affected by congenital
disability while between 10–20% of people are disabled: the majority of disability arises not from
genetic causes but from lifestyle, disease and other environmental factors. Accidents are the highest
cause of childhood mortality and morbidity.
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Informed choice?
Investment in the science and technology of diagnosis and screening has outstripped investment
in the softer but equally important work of training, communication, counselling and support. This
means that the rhetoric of choice conceals failures of provision which imperil ethical practice. For
example, there is a lack of balanced information about the conditions for which testing is offered.
Prospective parents are not necessarily told about lifewith a disability, and the possibilities for support
and inclusion: instead, communication focuses on symptoms and limitations. Testimony from people
with disabilities is rarely if ever included (Shakespeare, 2006).
Despite an ethic of non-directiveness, sometimes doctors and other clinicians exert explicit or
implicit pressure on their patients (Wertz, 1998).
Even where information and attitudes are better, there is a conveyor belt impetus to pregnancy
management, together with an unavoidable pressure of time, which makes it difﬁcult for prospective
parents to think through their choices and come to an informeddecision (Press & Browner, 1997). Each
decision seems to pre-empt the one that comes next. The choice to have serum screening dictates the
decision to have a follow-up diagnostic test if the pregnancy is found to be “high risk” and the only
action on receipt of a “positive” test result is termination, an outcome which might not have been
imagined at the beginning of that course of events.
In outlining these deﬁciencies, I am not calling for an end to choice or provision of information
and services, but for better and more careful approaches to prenatal screening and testing. More and
balanced information is badly needed, together with offers of counselling and support (Williams et al.,
2005). Not all parents may wish to avail themselves of these options. The goal is for people to make
decisions which feel right for them and which, as far as is possible, they do not regret later; no matter
how much they continue to feel distress. It is as important to spend time and money on information,
counselling and support, as on the science and technical issues of which markers and when to test.
Unintended consequences
The discussion of screening in bioethics or popular science also obscures the failures of prenatal
diagnosis: the false positives, the false negatives, the iatrogenic miscarriages which are an inevitable
aspect of the process. In UK, almost all pregnancies are screened for raised risk of Down syndrome
instead of, as was the case before, only the pregnancies of older women. Ninety-nine percent of
pregnancies which serum screening identiﬁes as being at raised risk turn out to be unaffected (false
positives). The diagnostic test which follows a positive screen is amniocentesis which, according to
the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists, carries an additional spontaneous termina-
tion risk of around 1% (Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists, 2010). This means that for
many women, their chance of being found to have a pregnancy affected by Down syndrome will be
approximately the same as their chances of losing the pregnancy as a result of the diagnostic test.
Frank and Sue Buckley (Buckley & Buckley, 2008a) have estimated that to prevent the birth of 660
Down syndrome babies, 400 healthy pregnancies would miscarry. If this calculation is accurate, this
suggests that in the UK, approximately 1000 healthy pregnancies are lost each year as a result of the
screening programme for Down syndrome. In addition, there are families who receive reassurance
from screening or testing that their pregnancy is not affected, who then go on to have a baby with
disability (false negatives). Research suggests that these false negatives can be harder to deal with
than the unexpected birth of an affected child in the absence of screening.
Biomedical compensations for social trends
While the proportion of prospective parents opting for termination remains constant, at just over
90%, there has been a 71% increase in diagnoses of Down syndrome over the last 20 years in Britain.
Despite screening, over the last 15 years there has been an increase of 25% of babies with Down
syndrome being born (Buckley & Buckley, 2008b). The major factor underlying this is an increase in
womenhavingchildren later in life, becausematernal age is amajor risk factor forDownsyndrome, just
as advanced paternal age is implicated in certain geneticmutations (Bray et al., 2006). The conjunction
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of these trends explains the interesting fact that thebirth-rate of childrenwithDownsyndromehasnot
fallenmarkedly, despite the heavy investment in diagnosis.What has been avoided has been themajor
increase in number of children with Down syndrome which might otherwise have resulted. Coupled
with rising rates of infertility and consequent assisted reproduction techniques, this phenomenon
highlights how changing social choices have necessitated increasing technologisation of conception
and pregnancy. It also suggests that interventions should focus on supporting people with Down
syndrome, not simply eliminating them.
Future directions
Where will it all end? The rapid pace of medical and scientiﬁc change causes alarm among some
members of the public. While it is impossible to be certain about the near future, let alone what will
occur in ﬁfty years, there are some suggestions that could be made.
On the positive side, it is likely that it will be possible to test pregnancies earlier and more safely. In
other words, fewer late abortions and fewer miscarriages, with all the associated trauma and distress.
Perhaps also the sensitivity and speciﬁcity of testing might be improved, reducing the numbers of
both false positives and false negatives.
On the negative side, it is likely that more possibilities for testing and choosing will open up, as it
is already beginning to happen with newborn screening and single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNP)
technology for late-onset diseases. If fetal blood can be reliably isolated in a maternal blood sample
(e.g. Bianchi et al., 2002), and if gene chips (Hacia et al., 1999) become widespread in clinical practice,
then potentially pregnancies could be tested for hundreds of conditions, not the few that are currently
possible.
Genome sequencing is becoming cheaper and faster, due to technologies such as parallel sequenc-
ing by synthesis (Rogers & Venter, 2005) and the use of nanowire or nanopore methods (Zheng et al.,
2006). Thismeans that parents aremore likely to know their carrier status in relation to recessive con-
ditions, and hence what potential risks their pregnancies might carry. It also means that it is quicker
and easier to test fetal cells for more conditions.
If assisted conception techniques improve, it may be that more parents opt for pre-implantation
diagnosis, which opens up many more possibilities for testing and selection. For example, it is very
unlikely, within current context of ethics, law and clinical guidance, that selective termination would
be performed for sex selection or to avoid late-onset conditions or to avoid fetuses which are carriers
of recessive conditions, at least in western democratic societies. However, all of these possibilities are
already happening in the case of pre-implantation genetic diagnosis, albeit in very few pregnancies.
This technology is currently aimed at known carriers of fatal childhood diseases and some carriers of
late-onset conditions such as Huntington’s disease and heritable forms of breast and colon cancer. But
its expansive potential is high. Currently, pre-implantation genetic diagnosis and assisted conception
are unreliable and complex techniques, meaning that many couples have to decide between the risk
of an affected baby (with normal conception) or no baby (with assisted conception).
With embryo selection or other advanced diagnostic approaches, the relationship of parent to child
may change. Extra choices bring additional responsibilities. When I was part of a team researching
how lay people felt about PGD, there was a strong sense that, while it was acceptable to use diagnosis
to avoid disease, it was highly questionable as a method of choosing other characteristics of a child.
People often talked in terms of children being “a gift not a commodity” (Scully et al., 2006). Perhaps,
like the so-called “yuck factor”, this opposition arises from public unfamiliarity with these techniques
and capabilities. Or maybe it captures something important about reproduction which our emphasis
on choice and control is in danger of obscuring.
Concluding thoughts
Personally, I am very positive about science and medicine, and optimistic about the beneﬁts of our
new knowledge and powers. I come from a medical family and have worked closely with geneticists,
who in my experience have high integrity and positive values. But I worry about the quality and tone
of the debate around genetics and prenatal diagnosis.
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I believe that too often, arguments are treated asmore straightforward than they are. By abstracting
from the real world in which people live and choose, issues appear simpler. It is tempting also to see
prenatal intervention as either wonderfully progressive and health-improving, or nightmarishly evil
and destructive. The truth is far less extreme and more complex.
I think that we need to attend to the complex, messy and irrational world in which people live and
make decisions.Weneed to understand that feelingsmatter.We should appreciate that choices reﬂect
not medical certainties or consistent logic, but also wider cultural values and beliefs arrangements
within a particular society. Above all,wehave to ask ourselves an important question: arewewilling to
welcome and support people with disabilities as future citizens with human rights and a contribution
to make to our society?
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